Study on South Korea's Recent Low Fertility Resolution Option

 

Myung-Hee Kim

Smith Liberal Arts College, Sahmyook University 815 Hwarang-ro, Nowon-gu, Seoul 01795, Republic of Korea

 

ABSTRACT:

Background/Objectives: This paper attempts to analyze the situation of the Korean government’s response to recovering the birthrate and the contents of the Third Basic Plan for the Aging Society and Population, which have been implemented, to determine any changes and draw implications. Methods/Statistical analysis: Based on the theories of low fertility, various documents were collected and analyzed to confirm changing viewpoints of men and women regarding having children. The subjects of this study are the measures to address low fertility pursued by the Ministry of Health and Welfare for the last decade in South Korea. Findings: The study found that the Korean government seems to be trying to change its perspective in order to solve problems through new options as follows: 1] It suggested a long-term roadmap to ensure consistent implementation of tasks that cannot be completed during the third basic plan period in terms of time. 2] It focuses on the transition towards maturity in which institutions are implemented and cultures for implementation are built. 3] It demonstrates willingness to actively promote social structural reform to solve fundamental problems. However, the third plan was not found to fundamentally differ from the strategies of the existing plans. Improvements/Applications: The paradigm shift regarding measures to alleviate the low birthrate must be further strengthened and focus on the root causes of the low rate. Subsequent studies are needed.

 

 

 

1.    INTRODUCTION:

South Korea(hereafter, Korea)had a high birth rate, with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 6.0 in 1960. In the process of restoration after the Korean War, Korean people began having many children, and the government considered birth control as a way to ensure the country’s survival. The generations born at that time are the so-called family planning movement generations or baby boomers. The family planning movement, which started in the 1960s, was part of a policy to suppress the number of births. After this, evidence of the effectiveness of policies began to appear as the fertility rate continued to decline.

 

 

 

 

The TFR already equaled the population replacement level in 1983. Nevertheless, the government believed it was a temporary phenomenon that would soon recover, and thus continued to encourage repression.¹ The government continued pursuing birth control policies, eventually acknowledging the failure of the population policy in 1996, and then shifting policy direction. The policy goal was to improve the quality of children, to increase the birth rate without preference for male children.

 

Korea, which has now pursued the population restraint policy for 35 years, prepared measures to deal with the low birth rate and aging society in earnest in the 2000s. In 2006, the country began establishing the first basic plan to cope with the social and economic impact of the recovery of the fertility rate due to the prolonged low birth rate. The second basic plan in 2011 and the third basic plan in 2016 are underway. However, the TFR of Korean women is still low, as shown in Table 1.^{2, 3}

 

 

Table 1.Totalfertility rate (TFR) of South Korea (unit: person)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
TFR	1.12	1.25	1.19	1.15	1.23	1.24	1.30	1.19	1.21	1.24

Source: Statistics Korea. 2015.http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1428

 

This paper attempts to analyze the situation of the Korean government’s response to the recovery of the birth rate and the contents of the Third Basic Plan for the Aging Society and Population, which have already been implemented, to determine if any changes have been made and draw implications. The analytical method was a literature analysis. The resources analyzed include formal and informal publications such as government publications, statistical databases, and journal articles in Korea and abroad.

 

According to the demographic transition theory, the old paradigm was that of homeostasis. In other words, when the population and resources were out of balance, certain mechanisms restored balance.⁴ However, the following theories explain that this paradigm is no longer appropriate.

 

Demand theory, also known as rational choice theory, states that people who have children must consider whether the benefits of childbirth exceed the costs. In other words, it seeks to maximize utility, meaning that if there are more benefits gained from alternatives to childbirth, then an alternative is selected. A decrease in the birth rate means that the relative value of the child has decreased, the income of the couple has decreased, or a change has occurred in the form of the couple’s utility for other children’s goods.^{5, 6}Demand theory suggests that if you want a positive outcome for your childbirth decision, the economic costs of raising a child must be reduced and the parents’ income increased to change the functioning of the child. Therefore, in this case, it is effective to provide transfer payments to those who have children through income raising, because the opportunity cost of the child increases if parents’ market labor is not linked to childbirth.⁷

 

According to the theory of risk and opportunity, people with children make decisions that change the future life cycle, and their decisions depend on the future.⁸If economic, social, and individual futures are uncertain, people can make safety mistakes or pursue opportunities within range to avoid crises. If lifetime employment collapses, housing costs fluctuate, and risk perception increases, geographic shifts are made for employment purposes. Rather than investing in instability due to having children (low wages during the period, anxiety of returning to work, high consumption expenditure, economic responsibility for children, etc.), crisis theory states that people are more likely to choose economic stability (education, labor force). According to Banks, the declining birth rate in the UK is not related to middle-class ethics such as the appropriate time to marry,⁹and in some ways, crisis and opportunity are another area of demand theory.

 

According to post-materialist values theory, a change in value changes the function of utility from a child to other goods. Changes in value are highly relevant to sociological approaches. In other words, changes in social and demographic attitudes are created by individual self-realization, satisfaction with individual preferences, and the traditional power of authority, especially as liberalism and liberal values grow in religion.¹⁰ The value of post-materialism is often associated with increased rates of divorce, cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock births, and this phenomenon is particularly prominent in countries based on Northern European liberalism that speak English. Coleman argues that among developed countries, liberal societies have a higher fertility rate than traditional societies (southern Europe, German, and Asian developing countries). On the other hand, relatively traditional value-oriented countries have lower divorce rates, cohabitation rates, out-of-wedlock fertility rates, and lower TFRs.¹¹ According to this approach, increases and decreases in fertility rates can be affected by institutions that reflect social values.

 

Gender equity theory explains the ultra-low birth rate in developed countries as a mismatch between gender equality levels applied in different social systems. In low-fertility countries, gender equality is high in social systems such as education and employment, but low in social systems such as industrial relations (employment conditions and content), family services, tax systems, social security, and family welfare.¹²

 

If women have equal educational and vocational qualifications as men, they limit the number of children who are ultimately concerned about being deprived of opportunities due to childbirth and ultimately delaying childbearing. According to this theory, on the other hand, the level of gender equality in individual - centered systems has improved in all developed countries, but the male livelihood support model still supports family-centered social systems. The stronger the family system, the higher is  level of discord between social systems, and the lower the fertility rate. This is why the lowest fertility rate in the world is in Southern Europe with its society based on the traditional, male-centered family system.¹³From this policy viewpoint, it is essential to improve the system surrounding the male livelihood support model of the family.

 

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS:

2.1. Research method:

In this study, the research method was based on the theories of low fertility. The method used was collecting and analyzing various documents to confirm the changing viewpoints of men and women in Korea regarding the recent birthrate.

 

2.2. Research object:

The object of this study was the measures implemented to address low fertility by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in the South Korean government.

 

3. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF FERTILITY OF KOREAN MEN AND WOMEN:

In 2015, Korea had a TFR of 1.24 people, which is a very low birth rate. It has risen by 0.13 in the past 10 years since reaching a low of 1.08 in 2005. Meanwhile, it is known that Korean values regarding marriage and children have changed. According to a survey conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs on the nationwide birth rate, family health, and welfare in 2015, the following provides evidence of the abovementioned points:^{3, 5}

 

Changes in the value of marriage: Increase in the number of single people and delayed marriage

 

 

In a survey of unmarried men and women on the need for marriage, the percentage of unmarried males who answered “must do” fell to 60.8% in 2015 from 71.5% in 2005. On the other hand, the ratio of unmarried women who answered “must do” decreased from 49.1% in 2005 to 39.7% in 2015, as shown in Table 2. Over the past decade, both married and unmarried women have greatly reduced their perception of the need for marriage. The perception among unmarried men and women that marriage is indispensable is decreasing in Korean society. As a result, the number of unmarried men and women who delay their first marriage or who are not married is increasing.

 

Changes in values regarding children:

In a survey on the need to have children, married women said that they should have children, although 60.2% of these women said that they do not have children. In total, 39.9% of unmarried males and 29.5% of unmarried females responded that they should have children, as shown in Table 3. This indicates that unmarried men and women were more negative towards childbirth.

 

Burden of childcare costs:

In recent years, the rapid increase in childcare costs has reduced the birth rate and multi-child births of married women. It has also prevented the future marriage of unmarried women, as shown in Table 4. Specifically, high spending on private education provides a reason to decide to give birth to one child rather than multiple children.

 

 

Table 2.Changing perceptions of unmarried men and women (aged 20–44 years) (unit: %)

Gender	Year	Must do	Be good to do	Good to do or do not have to do	Good not to do	No comment	Total
Unmarried men	2005	29.4	42.1	23.4	2.2	2.9	100.0
	2015	18.1	42.7	33.0	3.9	2.4	100.0
Unmarried Women	2005	12.8	36.3	44.9	3.7	2.2	100.0
	2015	7.7	32.0	52.4	5.7	2.3	100.0

Source: http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=331&tblId=DT_ 33101N801&conn_path=I2

 

Table 3. Attitudes of married women and unmarried men and women on children (unit: %)

Category		Must have	Good to have	No need	No comment	Total
Married women		60.2	29.0	10.6	0.1	100.0
Unmarried	Men	39.9	40.6	17.5	1.9	100.0
	Women	28.4	40.0	29.5	2.2	100.0

Source: http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId= 331&tblId=DT_ 33101N301 &conn_path=I2

http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=331&tblId=DT_33101N1010&conn_path=I2

 

 

Table 4. Average monthly child support expenditure by married women (unit: mil.won)

Category	Childcare	Public Education	Private Education	Care			Etc.	Non-Classification	Total
				Parent	Kinship	Non-blood
One-child home	3.3	5.9	18.5	3.4	0.4	0.9	29.6	2.8	64.8
Two-child home	4.1	22.4	43.3	1.7	0.1	0.5	47.4	9.1	128.6
Three-child home	4.9	26.6	48.9	1.2	0.4	0.7	58.8	11.5	152.9

Source: Lee Sam Sik et al. 2015.²

Table 5. Number of births according to the employment status of married women(unit: person)

Category	20s	30s	40s	Total (non-standardized age)	Total (standardized age)
Employment	0.84	1.53	1.94	1.77	1.73
Non-employment	1.14	1.65	1.89	1.73	1.77

Source: Lee Sam Sik et al. 2015.²

 

 

Support for compatibility between home and work:

In Korea, married women actively participate in the labor market. However, most face the challenge of performing the dual roles of working and child raising. Particularly, although married women have maternity leave and childcare leave, they do not have children or avoid having more children, because of unfavorable disadvantages in the labor market, as shown in Table 5.

 

The unequal role between men and women in the home:

The Confucian culture in Korea has resulted in distinct roles for men and women in the home. Men mostly perform outdoor work, while women do housework. This long tradition led to inequalities between men and women in married life within the family. For example, men do little housework when they get home. In particular, dual-income married women are forced to do both domestic work and labor, as shown in Table 6. These reasons prevent women from having children or having more children.

 

Table 6.Housework hours of men and women unit (hour: min.)

Category	Weekday		Saturday		Sunday
	Mean time		Mean time		Mean time
Year	2009	2014	2009	2014	2009	2014
Men	0:35	0:39	0:56	1:01	1:08	1:13
Women	3:33	3:25	3:50	3:37	3:43	3:33

Source: Statistics Korea, 2015, Work and Family Balance Indicators

http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=351416

 

4. DISCUSSION:

New Option by the Central Government in the Third Basic Plan for Low Fertility and the Aged Society (2016–2020):

The Korean government has already established and promoted “the First and Second Basic Plans for the Ageing Society and Population, ”which reflect the perception changes of people in 2006 and 2011 respectively. The first basic plan—the first Saeromaji plan—intended to address the low fertility rate and ageing population. The second basic plan—the second Saeromaji plan—was implemented in 2011, and included provisions for day care subsidies, tax and housing incentives for large families, and extended the leave available for maternity and childcare.

 

In 2016, the government also announced the Vision 2020plan as a new option for responding to the decreasing rate. This plan intends to shift some of the burden of childcare and elderly care from the family to general society. It is planned to spend 108.4 trillion KRW (96.3 billion USD) on new and existing schemes to increase the birth rate between 2016 and 2020. Women in this age group and their spouses may prove more responsive to government intervention than other age groups.⁵

 

The vision of the third basic plan is the realization of a sustainable society wherein all generations are happy. The goal is “a society that wants to have children.” Specific strategies for achieving the outlined goals include: [1] Relieving socioeconomic causes of people delaying or foregoing marriage, [2] strengthening social responsibility for birth and parenting, [3]improving the education and childcare environment to reduce the burden of childcare, and [4] eliminating blind spots of work-family compatibility. It also includes various programs to increase childcare and after-school programs, provide subsidies for daycare, and decrease taxes for households with young children.⁶

 

5. CONCLUSION:

This paper argues that the low birth rate phenomenon that has lasted for more than 20 years eventually led the Korean government towards a policy paradigm shift. This paradigm shift includes not only the tools used to achieve policy goals, but also the revision of ideas and standards frameworks that address social issues. From this perspective, the Korean government seems to be trying to change its perspective towards solving problems by providing new options as follows: 1] It suggested a long-term roadmap to ensure consistent implementation of tasks that cannot be completed during the third basic plan period in terms of time. 2] It focuses on the transition towards maturity in which institutions are implemented and cultures for implementation are built. 3] It demonstrates willingness to actively promote social structural reform to solve fundamental problems.

 

However, according to paradigm theories, a true policy paradigm shift means changes to policy goals, means, and conceptual frameworks. Unfortunately, the contents of the strategies in the third plan do not reveal any fundamental differences when compared to the strategies of existing plans. As long as the plan does not bring about a change in the marriage system itself, as in France, it will be difficult to expect major changes in the third basic plan.

6. REFERENCES:

1.      Lee Sam Sik, Low Fertility Rate and Policy Responses in Korea, The Japanese Journal of Population, 2009, 7 (1)

2.      Lee Sam Sik, Park Jong-Suh, Lee So-Young, Oh Mi-Ae, Choi Hyo-Jin, Song Min-Young, The 2015 National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, 2015

3.      The Korea Herald, Economic Woes, Rise of Women and Growing Individualism Prompt Koreans to Rethink Marriage, 2015, March 27

4.      Wilson C, Airey P, How can a Homeostatic Perspective Enhance Demographic Transition Theory, Population Studies, 1999, 53 (2), pp.117–128

5.      Kim Young Rok, Shin Dong Myeon, Evaluation of Appropriateness of Policy Objectives: Instruments in Policies in Response to Low Fertility in South Korea, Korea Institute of Public Administration, Research Paper, 2016

6.      Stephen E, Bracing for Low Fertility and a Large Elderly Population in South Korea, Korea Economic Institute, 2012, April 18

7.      Becker G, A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1981

8.      McDonald P, Demographic Life Transitions: An Alternative Theoretical Paradigm, Health Transition Review, Supplement 6, 1996, pp.385–392

9.      Banks J, Prosperity and Parenthood, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954

10.   Lesthaeghe R, Moors G, Living Arrangements, Socio-economic Position and Values among Young Adults: A Pattern Description of Finance, West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands 1990, in D. Coleman (ed.), Europe’s Population in the 1990s, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.163–221

11.   Coleman D, Reproduction and Survival in an Unknown World: What Drives Today’s Industrial Populations and to What Future? Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, NIDI Hosfstee Lecture Series, 5, 1998

12.   McDonald P, Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility, Population and Development Review, 2000, 26(3), pp. 427–439

13.   Statistics Korea, Work and Family Balance Indicators, 2015

 

 

 

Received on 22.08.2018           Modified on 19.10.2018

Accepted on 11.12.2018         © RJPT All right reserved